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Accepting as deposits (poor) people's money
The cooperative sector has grown in number and
resources in the last few years. In 1990, 4,744 coopera-
tives registered with the Cooperative Development Au-
thority (CDA). By 1997, as many as 45,721 have been
registered with the CDA. While there are no aggregate
figures available on their total resources, one notes that
several credit cooperatives have total assets ranging from
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P15 million to P60 million. These figures dwarf the re-
sources reported by some rural banks.1
An important subset of the cooperative sector is
that of the credit cooperatives and multi-purpose coop-
eratives which take deposits. For the purpose of this
Notes, they are lumped together into what is known as
deposit-taking cooperatives.
Deposit-taking cooperatives (DTCs) have custodial
responsibility over the deposits that members place with
them. This is not a light matter especially because the
members of DTCs come from the low and middle income
classes. And DTCs raise millions of pesos of deposits
from small savers. It is not clear, however, whether there




Congress, through Republic Act 6839, created the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) to promote,
develop and regulate cooperatives. The law gave expres-
sion to the Constitutional mandate for Congress "to cre-
ate an agency to promote the viability and growth of co-
operatives as instruments for social justice and economic

*This draws on Lee Arbuckle, Rescina Bhagwani, Gilberto Llanto
and Ma. Piedad Geron "Review of the Regulatory Environment for Credit
Cooperatives and Multi-Purpose Cooperatives with Large Credit Opera-
tions," a report submitted to the National Credit Council, Department of
Finance, Credit Policy Improvement Program, November 1998.
**"Where in the world are we?"
1Thirty eight credit cooperatives reported assets ranging from P15
million to P60 million as of July 1998. CDA data on reporting credit
cooperatives covered only 10 of 16 regions in the country.2
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development" (Section 15, Article XII, 1987 Constitution).
At the same time, Congress assigned a regulatory func-
tion to CDA.
In carrying out its mandate, CDA focused more on
discharging its developmental role, and gave minor at-
tention to sound registry and regulation of active coop-
eratives. For its developmental role, CDA conducts man-
agement and training programs for cooperatives and pro-
vides them with financial assistance through grants, do-
nations and subsidized loans. What the CDA perceives
to be its main regulatory function is the registration of
cooperatives, federations and unions. Thus, the empha-
sis seems to have been on accommodating the huge num-
ber of cooperatives seeking registration.2 Little attention
has been given to the cancellation of registration of those
cooperatives that do not file their annual reports and
audited financial statements. No attention has been given
at all to monitoring the financial health of thousands of
deposit-taking cooperatives that mobilize savings from
the low and middle income classes.
 Because of low barriers to entry, e.g., minimum
capital required for a cooperative wanting to be regis-
tered is a measly P2,000.00, and the attractive tax and
other incentives waiting a registered cooperative, as many
as 45,721 cooperatives have been registered with CDA
as of end of 1997. With so many registered cooperatives
needing "developmental" assistance, the CDA faces the
daunting task of assisting those cooperatives to the det-
riment of efficient registry and regulation.
The developmental role conflicts with the regula-
tory role. The case of the (defunct) Central Bank of the
Philippines offers a clear example of the difficulties of
institutions with inconsistent objectives leading to incon-
sistent roles. The Central Bank faced the dilemma of ef-
ficiently supervising and, at the same time, regulating
banks and providing them with development finance. The
inconsistency was resolved by making the Central Bank
concentrate on its regulatory function and handing over
to government financial institutions the task of providing
development finance to private banks.
In the case of CDA's posture toward deposit-taking
cooperatives, the development function of organizing and
providing technical assistance to cooperatives conflicts
with the registry and standard-setting functions. This pro-
duces an organization, i.e., the CDA, that is ambivalent
in its objectives, role, and function.
The challenge to policymakers:
which way is it for the CDA?
It is difficult and probably impossible for the same
organization to carry out well two different and inconsis-
tent functions. For the CDA as an organization, it is diffi-
cult to discharge both the developmental, and registry
and regulation functions of deposit-taking cooperatives.
Registry and regulation, on the one hand, are mu-
tually-reinforcing responsibilities assigned by law to the
CDA. Because of well-known information asymmetry prob-
lems in the financial market that give rise to moral haz-
ard problems, the state normally assigns a regulator to
protect depositors and investors in financial institutions.
This holds true for the CDA.
On the other hand, the development function is not
an indispensable role for the CDA. The record and the
experience, for instance, show that government's involve-
"With so many registered cooperatives
needing "developmental" assistance, the
CDA faces the daunting task of assisting
those cooperatives to the detriment of
efficient registry and regulation."

2The inaction of the CDA on an application within 30 days consti-
tutes an approval of the same. Denial of application may be appealed to
the Office of the President of the Philippines. If not acted upon within 90




themselves can vote with
their feet, in a manner of
speaking, by rewarding safe
credit cooperatives with
more deposits, thereby al-
lowing these organizations
to generate more business
and profits for members. In
a way, this is the most pow-
erful form of regulation and
only with the availability of
correct and timely informa-
tion can this be successfully achieved.
The CDA's role in providing access to timely and
correct information is therefore critical. This could be done
by setting standards, imposing a uniform chart of ac-
counts and accounting rules, requiring the submission
of audited financial statements and showing a lot of seri-
ousness in canceling the registry of erring cooperatives.4
At the same time, it could collaborate with the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation and the various federations and unions of
credit cooperatives in harmonizing regulatory policies.
Only with the above can the CDA truly exercise its
mandate of regulation over DTCs.  4
ment in the "organization
and development" of coop-
eratives has created per-
verse incentives on the part
of the organized coopera-
tives. Recent field findings3
as well as results of past
studies indicate that many
cooperatives that were or-
ganized for the sole purpose
of receiving subsidized, di-
rected loans have long
closed shop. Those coop-
eratives have either disbanded or have become inactive
after getting subsidized loans from government or gov-
ernment financial institutions. So much for the
government's "developmental" role in the cooperative
sector.
There are options for the CDA with respect to the
developmental function. Following the principle of
subsidiarity, the CDA can delegate this function to well-
selected cooperative federations and unions. It is the
good fortune of the cooperative sector that there are
privately-organized cooperative federations and unions
that have proven their skill and experience in the promo-
tion and development of cooperatives.
Of much more importance for the state, especially
to depositors, is the effective regulation of deposit-
taking cooperatives. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas su-
pervises and regulates banks. While the CDA has been
tasked to regulate DTCs, it is not doing a good job at it.
CDA can thus concentrate on regulating the financial in-
termediation activities of deposit-taking cooperatives.
Reinforcing the market
There are several thousand credit cooperatives and
multi-purpose cooperatives that take deposits. As such,
it would be a very tough job for the CDA to perform an
effective oversight function unless it adopts appropriate
measures to reinforce regulation by the market. With
timely and correct information about credit cooperatives,
"With timely and correct information
about credit cooperatives, members and
customers themselves can vote with their
feet, in a manner of speaking, by
rewarding safe credit cooperatives with
more deposits, thereby allowing these
organizations to generate more business
and profits for members."

3Arbuckle et al. (ibid.) and Gilberto M. Llanto, "The Financial Struc-
ture and Performance of Philippine Credit Cooperatives." Discussion Pa-
per No. 94-04, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1994.
4CDA registration is a precious commodity. Without it, a coopera-
tive would not be able to enjoy various tax perks and incentives, e.g.,
subsidized loan from CDA.
For further information, please contact
The Research Information Staff
Philippine Institute for Development Studies
NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street
Legaspi Village, Makati City
Telephone Nos: 8924059 and 8935705;





List of PIDS Discussion Papers
for 1998*
*Discussion papers are studies that are preliminary and subject to
revisions. This listing consists of discussion papers released from Oc-
tober to November 1998.
98-26 Productivity Growth in the Philippines
After the Industrial Reforms
Myrna S. Austria
98-27 The Emerging Philippine Investment Environment
Myrna S. Austria
98-28 Beyond 2000: Assessment of Economic
Performance and an Agenda for Sustainable Growth
Josef T. Yap
98-29 In Search of Metropolitan Definitions:
Lessons from Metro Davao
Ruben G. Mercado
98-30 Megalopolitan Manila: Striving Towards a Humane
and World Class Megacity
Ruben G. Mercado
98-31 Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines:
Passing Fancy or the Future Megatrend?
Ruben G. Mercado and Rosario G. Manasan
98-32 Environment and Natural Resources Management:
Lessons from City Program Innovations
Ruben G. Mercado
98-33 The Case of Butuan City: A Consistent Regional
Outstanding Winner in Nutrition (CROWN)
Virginia S. Pineda and Jazmin D. Berido
98-34 Olongapo: A Healthy City
Virginia S. Pineda and Aurora Joson
98-35 Partnership for Health: A Case Study of Lapu-lapu City
Virginia S. Pineda
98-36 Health Management: Strategies from Selected Cities
Virginia S. Pineda
98-37 Financing and Delivery of Urban Services
in the Philippines: An Overview
Rosario G. Manasan
98-38 Water in Metro Cebu: The Case for Policy
and Institutional Reforms
Cristina C. David, Arlene B. Inocencio, F. M. Largo
and E. L. Walag
98-39 Towards an Efficient Path to Food Security:
The Philippine Case
Cristina C. David
98-40 Developing an Early Warning System for BOP
and Financial Crises: The Case of the Philippines
Josef T. Yap
98-41 Understanding Household Water Demand
for Metro Cebu
Francisco M. Largo, Arlene B. Inocencio,
and Cristina C. David
98-42 A Study of Housing Subsidies in the Philippines
Gilberto M. Llanto, Aniceto C. Orbeta, Jr.,
Ma. Teresa C. Sanchez and Marie Christine G. Tang
98-12 Metro Iloilo: A Struggle for Acceptance
and Organization (Revised)
Ruben G. Mercado and Raul S. Anlocotan
98-13 Metropolitan Naga: A Continuing Challenge
of Local Autonomy and Sustainability (Revised)
Ruben G. Mercado and Victor B. Ubaldo
98-14 Providing a Metropolitan Perspective
to Development Planning: Cagayan de Oro (Revised)
Ruben G. Mercado and Casimira Balandra
98-15 Metropolitan Cebu: The Challenge of Definition
and Management (Revised)
Ruben G. Mercado
98-16 Owning the Metropolitan Vision:
The Case of BLIST (Revised)
Ruben G. Mercado and Carmel P. Chammag
98-17 Financing and Delivery of Health and Sanitation
Services through Effective Resource Mobilization
and Inter-governmental Coordination: A Case Study
of Cotabato City (Revised)
Virginia S. Pineda and Ma. Lourdes Lim
98-18 People Power at Work: The Case of the Surigao City
Primary Health Care (PHC) Federated Women's Club
(Revised)
Virginia S. Pineda and Jazmin Berido
98-19 Emergency Rescue Naga: An LGU-Managed
Emergency Rescue Project (Revised)
Virginia S. Pineda and Rose Buan
98-20 Puerto Princesa City's Satellite Clinics:
A Curative Rural Network (Revised)
Virginia S. Pineda
98-21 Reaching Out: Gingoog City's Total Integrated
Development Approach (G-TIDA) (Revised)
Virginia S. Pineda and Clark Clarete
98-22 The Low-Cost Housing Program
of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
Anicia C. Sayos and Antonio C. Fernandez
98-23 The "Lote Para sa Mahihirap" Housing Program
of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental
Anicia C. Sayos and Estela F. Paredes
98-24 "Kaantabay sa Kauswagan" (Partners in Development)
Mass Housing Strategy: The Case of Naga City
Anicia C. Sayos
98-25 The International Economic Environment
and the Philippine Economy
Ponciano S. Intal, Jr. and Leilanie Q. Basilio